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THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOCTRINE IN THE AFTERMATH
OF THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
Negotiable instrument law historically has contained a provision for a
holder in due course, a very special character who curiously enough was never
afflicted with all of the infirmities of the ordinary holder of a negotiable
instrument. The obviously superior quality of this holder has prompted courts
and scholars to describe him as the "emperor of the bona fide purchasers"'
and even as the "super plaintiff."2 Today, however, this extraordinary
creature of the law is being disfigured-and possibly faces eventual
extinction-in the area of consumer installment credit transactions.
The purpose behind the creation of such a superior character as a holder
in due course was to encourage the free negotiability of commercial paper. By
removing certain anxieties of the innocent purchaser of negotiable instru-
ments, negotiation was facilitated.3 Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
four requirements must be met before a holder in due course status can arise:
the transferee of the negotiable instrument has to be (1) a holder, (2) for
value, (3) in good faith, and (4) without notice that the instrument was
overdue or had been dishonored, or of any defense against or claim to it on
the part of any person.4 Once all of these requirements have been met, the
holder in due course is totally immune to all personal defenses, and subject to
only a few real defenses.'
Although only real defenses are available against a holder in due course
under the Uniform Commercial Code, the courts have judicially expanded the
list of acceptable defenses. 6 The development of additional defenses empha-
sized judicial concern for the inequitable result to a consumer where the seller
and his transferee (a holder in due course) have maintained a close
relationship. In the aftermath of the enactment of the Federal Truth in
Lending Act,' the courts are now manufacturing still more defenses to avoid
1. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 456 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as WHITE & SUMMERS].
2. Illinois Valley Acceptance Corp. v. Woodard, 304 N.E. 2d 859, 863 (Ind. Ct. App.
1974).
3. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 109, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (1967); see also Calvert Credit
Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494, 496 (D.C. 1968).
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302 [hereinafter cited as UCC]. For the Illinois
court's application of the code see Atlanta National Bank v. Johnson Tractor Sales. 130 Ill. App.
2d 793, 796, 267 N.E.2d 358, 361 (1971).
5. UCC § 3-305. The real defenses include infancy, incapacity, duress, illegality,
insolvency and fraud in the factum.
6. See Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. 1968), and Unico v. Owen,
50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). Today see Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 363 F.
Supp. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1973), and Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D.
I1. 1972).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1974).
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the effect of an assertion of holder in due course. The reason for this recent
judicial manipulation appears to be that the need for a holder in due course
defense is outweighed by other more important considerations affecting a
consumer in his installment credit transactions. Although many state legisla-
tures have taken cognizance of this judicial concern and have enacted
appropriate legislation, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive regulation
restricting the holder in due course doctrine in the area of consumer
installment credit transactions-regulation which only Congress can adequate-
ly provide. The patchwork-type law resulting from various court decisions and
individual state legislation has become oppressive to consumers because of its
failure to deal uniformly with the holder in due course defense in all
jurisdictions.
The following discussion will outline present attitudes regarding the
holder in due course doctrine in the aftermath of the Federal Truth in Lending
Act, and then will analyze the usefulness of the existence of such a doctrine
for consumer installment credit transactions by reviewing past and recent
judicial decisions, current state statutes and present criticisms.
THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE UNDER THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
The Effect of Being a "Creditor"
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TLA), the
courts relied on theories of agency-principal, 8 oneness,9 or close connected-
ness10 in order to avoid "hard cases"'" involving the defense of holder in due
course (HDC) in consumer installment credit transactions. An additional
opportunity to mitigate the harshness of the HDC doctrine was given the
courts by the TLA, which provided a means-the broad definition of
creditor 2-to pierce the HDC shield. That broad definition has encouraged
the courts to be liberal in their application of it. A "creditor" refers only to
persons who regularly extend or arrange for the extension of credit to
consumers 3 for which the payment of a finance charge is required, whether it
be in connection with loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise.' 4
Regulation Z of the TLA adds little additional insight as to the definitional
8. Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494, 496 (D.C. 1968).
9. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 480.
10. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 110, 116, 232 A.2d 405, 410, 413 (1967); see also
Illinois Valley Acceptance Corp. v. Woodard, 304 N.E.2d 859, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
11. Johnston, Unico v. Owen-Judicial Mastery of the "Hard Case," 24 RUTGERS L. REV.
500 (1970). "Hard case" is a term used by the author in referring to a case with difficult factual
and legal problems which may result in bad law. "Hard case" was taken from the dissenting
opinion of Northern Sec. Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1974), Truth in Lending Act; and see § 1602(f).
13. The Truth in Lending Act covers only that credit which is extended to natural persons
and specifically excludes credit arranged between corporations, see F.R.S. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §
226.2(k) (1974); see also a court's acceptance of this limitation in Joseph v. Norman's Health
Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307, 317 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1974).
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limits of a creditor.' 5 Under the broad TLA definition of creditor, a holder
seemingly may be-drawn into the original transaction as a creditor, subject to
the TLA, instead of remaining a holder who is at least once removed from the
original credit transaction. There is thus a direct impact on the "good faith"
and "notice" elements of the HDC doctrine by implying knowlege of the
original credit agreement to a holder who qualifies as a TLA creditor.
The courts 6 have construed the statutory definition as an invitation to
liberally interpret the term "creditor," and have even extended it to include
others who are closely involved in the financial arrangements. For example, in
Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc.," the court held that the bank was a
creditor under the TLA definition on the basis that it had extended or
arranged for the extension of credit to Spa's members through the "conduit'" 8
of Spa. The "conduit" characterization was developed because Spa had
tendered 100% of the obligations of its members to the same bank, and the
bank in turn had accepted 88% for discounting, only after checking the credit
references of each one tendered. The bank had retained the final choice of
accepting or rejecting a particular member's note. In addition, at least sixty
notes were repurchased by Spa upon default pursuant to an agreement with
the bank. The court, citing an analogous case,' 9 said that lenders may not
escape the TLA status of creditors by using sales companies as "front
men." 20 The court's opinion in Kriger made it clear that there was no reason
to protect a holder, as an HDC, by excluding him from the definition of
creditor under the TLA, when the front man (Spa) had merely carried out all
the arrangements dictated by the bank (holder). Hence, the bank was not a
UCC 3-302 "holder" under the TLA, since it was deemed to be a "creditor"
with notice and knowledge of the original credit transaction.
In Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc.,2" the court dealt with the
creditor issue in a similar manner. In a class action for violation of the TLA,
the court concluded that assignees of consumer installment credit contracts,
who regularly extend or arrange for the extension of credit to consumers
through the assignors of such contracts, may themselves be creditors under
the TLA. In support of its holding, the court noted that the assignee had
underwritten all of the health clinic's consumer finance programs for almost
ten years and had regularly loaned money to the clinic. Although the assignee
did not supply the clinic with form contracts or have direct contact with its
contract debtors, their long relationship and the regular extension of credit to
15. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(m), 226.1 (a) (1974), explaining that a creditor is one who in the
ordinary course of business regularly extends or arranges for the extension of consumer credit.
16. To date, only the federal district courts have construed the effect of the TLA on the
HDC doctrine.
17. 363 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
18. Id. at 336.
19. Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955, 964 (N.D. I1. 1972).
20. 363 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
21. 347 F. Supp. 955, 964 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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assignor's contract debtors prompted the court to find that the assignee was
the "prime mover"2 in each transaction by arranging the extension of credit
to consumers through the conduit of the health clinic.
The Garza court had therefore recognized the significance of the conduit
test in determining the creditor responsible under the TLA. The assignee
cofisequently was unable to assert the defense of HDC as against the
consumer. Under the TLA he was deemed a creditor, and thus subject to the
penalties for any violations of the TLA. The once iron-clad defense of HDC
had apparently softened in the face of the broad TLA definition of creditor,
and the disfiguration of the HDC creature continued.
In Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet,23 the court recognized the consumer
credit transaction as one which involved the front man situation confronted in
Kriger. Holding the finace company to be a creditor and therefore violating
the credit disclosure requirements of the TLA, the court reasoned that where
a finance company works closely with a seller and actually prepares the
consumer credit contracts and the seller merely executes and assigns them
back to the finance company, then the finance company must be considered a
TLA creditor. 4 In Philbeck, the court was confronted with GMAC as the
finance company for a GM dealer (Timmers Chevrolet); it held that GMAC
was a creditor under the TLA, since GMAC supplied the forms and regularly
used Timmers as a conduit through which to place its installment sales
contracts with consumers.
In addition to providing a broad definition of creditor, which prompted
courts to develop theories such as "conduit," the TLA also expresses an
intent that each creditor (if more than one is involved) must disclose all
finance charges in accordance with the general requirements of the TLA.25
Regulation Z also stresses the importance of disclosure by each creditor.2 6
Therefore, in absence of clear proof of key factors necessary to establish the
conduit theory, such as exclusive dealing, preparation of contract forms, or
review of the actual credit applications, today's practitioner might be able to
advance an alternative argument based upon a co-creditor rationale.
The Defense of Illegality
Although judicial interpretations of the term "creditor" under the Truth
in Lending Act provided the consumer with one means of piercing the HDC
shield to guard against the deceptive practices of the cunning salesman and a
closely related finance company, the consumer may also have received the
key for a backdoor attack on the validity of the HDC defense. Under the
22. Id. at 965.
23. 361 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (N.D. Ga. 1973), rev d on other grounds, 499 F.2d 971 (5th
Cir. 1974).
24. 361 F. Supp. at 1261, 1262.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1974).
26. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(d) (1974).
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Uniform Commercial Code, it is clear that an HDC is subject only to the real
defenses, such as illegality.2 By arguing that a violation of the TLA is an
illegal business practice subject to civil"8 and criminal 9 sanctions, the
consumer may be able to successfully avoid the effects of the defense of the
HDC doctrine. Although there are no cases on this point, the Uniform
Commercial Code comments do not rule out violation of a consumer
protection statute as a basis of asserting illegality. The drafters, in the
comments, state that the illegality must be one which renders the agreement
null.30 Nullity exists when a person is allowed to treat an act as though it had
absolutely no legal effect or force." In the case of the TLA, the apparent
Congressional purpose for providing non-disclosure sanctions was to render
ineffective all agreements which did not make proper disclosures, at least as to
the finance charges imposed. To ensure this result, Congress provided for
damages based upon the actual finance charges sought.32 Thus, under the
TLA a creditor could become liable to the consumer for an amount equal to
or greater than the finance charges bargained for under the contract, leaving a
contract consisting of a straight loan of the principal at best. Recent
amendments to the TLA would provide further compensation beyond the
"finance charge" damages for any actual damages incurred by a consumer.3 3
Hence, a creditor conceivably could become liable to the consumer for an
amount which exceeds the total value of the contract. However, where such
excess liability does arise, it is uncertain whether courts will treat the contract
as null for illegality or whether recovery under the TLA will act merely as a
set-off. If a court is persuaded to accept the nullity conclusion, then the
consumer will be entitled both to recovery under the TLA and also to a valid
defense against the HDC. On the other hand, where the court concludes that
it is merely a set-off, then the consumer will be left only with his remedy of
recovery under the TLA and without a valid defense against an HDC. The
illegality argument under the TLA consequently would be ineffective as a
deterrent to holders in due course if the set-off conclusion is reached, as
actual damages may be difficult to establish.
State statutes,3" such as the Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act
27. UCC § 3-305 (2) (b).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1974).
29. Id. at§ 1611.
30. UCC § 3-305, comment 6.
31. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (Revised 4th ed. 1968); and see BALLENTINE'S LAW
DICTIONARY 871 (3rd ed. 1969), which explains that a nullity is a proceeding of no effect
whatsoever because of a defect therein.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640, 1611 (1974). Section 1640(a) permits civil liability based upon
finance charges as follows: liability equal to twice the finance charges but not less than $100 nor
greater than $1,000. Section 1611 provides for criminal penalties of $5,000 or imprisonment or
both. See also U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5706, § 408(a) (1) (Dec. 15, 1974). which
would allow an additional recovery to cover actual damages.
33. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5706. § 408(a) (1) (Dec. 15, 1974).
34. For a complete review of state statutes affecting the holder in due course doctrine in
other jurisdictions, see generally Willier, Need for Preservation of Buyers' Defenses-State
Statutes Reviewed, 5 UCCLJ 132 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Willier].
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(RISA), 3' have taken a similar position against violations of disclosure
requirements by providing that one who fails to make the requisite state
disclosures shall not be able to recover finance or other charges. The Illinois
courts have construed the term "recover" to include voluntary collection as
well as collection by legal action.3 6 The distinction between the TLA and
RISA is that the latter makes a "knowing" violation of the state disclosure act
a class A misdemeanor." Thus, the defense of illegality may be asserted more
easily by an Illinois consumer who establishes that the assignee (holder) is
accountable under Chapter 38.8
Congressional Intent
The stated pupose of the Truth in Lending Act is to assure a complete
disclosure of credit terms to allow the consumer an opportunity to compare all
credit terms available to him.3 9 Disclosure in accordance with the TLA is
enforced under the threat of civil and criminal sanctions.4 0 A conflict arises
because the act affords protection of the consumer at the expense of the
merchant, while the holder in due course doctrine, as enunciated in the
Uniform Commercial Code, affords protection to a "qualified" holder at the
expense of the consumer. The TLA is thus an apparent about-face in general
policy. Not only has the TLA denied immunity to an HDC who is a creditor,
but it also has provided for criminal and civil sanctions against a qualified
HDC. The net result is an HDC doctrine which is eroded with each liberal
judicial construction of the broad definition of creditor under the TLA. The
TLA also provides that an assignee of the original creditor may be liable
under the act where a violation is apparent on the face of the instrument
assigned .4 Although this provision may be interpreted as merely affecting the
"good faith" element of an HDC, it may also be a significant indicator of
Congressional intent to restrict the HDC defense when construed in light of
the stated purpose of the TLA.
As additional evidence of Congressional intent to restrict the HDC
doctrine, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 42 in
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211. §531(b) (1971).
36. Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc.. 347 F. Supp. 955, 963 (N.D. I1. 1972).
37. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 121 ,§531(a) (1971).
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 5-1, 5-2 (1972). Accountability through "common design"
was accepted in People v. Smith, 8 II1. App. 3d 729, 281 N.E.2d 767 (1972). Legislative intent
apparent in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , § 517(c) seems to be in accord with this illegality
argument since it provides that even an express agreement not to assert any defense against an
HDC is invalid if the holder has knowledge or notice (from its course of dealings) that the seller
has failed to lawfully disclose.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1974).
40. Id. at§§ 1640, 1611.
41. Id at § 1640(d); see also U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5708, § 115 (Dec. 15,
1974).
42. Although this Senate Committee was concerned with the issue of bank credit card
procedures and limitations (i.e. HDC doctrine), the underlying fact pattern involved a similar
three-party consumer credit transaction as discussed in Kriger, Garza, and Philbeck.
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its 1972 report, rejected by one vote a proposal to partially abolish the HDC
doctrine as it applies to bank credit card systems.4 3 The report indicated that
thirty-two states had already imposed limitations on the HDC with success. 44
Although not favoring the HDC defense, the Committee concluded that state
legislation to limit the HDC doctrine was preferable to federal action. 4 One
senator, in voicing his dissent, noted that an unlimited HDC concept has and
will continue to produce serious abuses for consumers, and would only
provide a temptation to sellers to supply poor quality merchandise. 4 In urging
abolition of the HDC doctrine, the senator stressed that although thirty-two
states 4 7 had acted on their own to repeal or modify the HDC doctrine in
installment credit sales, the free flow of credit had not been impeded, despite
dire credit industry predictions to the contrary s.4
THE FUTURE OF THE HDC DOCTRINE
Past Indicators
The courts had attempted to restrict the HDC doctrine prior to the
enactment of the TLA. By means of employing theories of agency-principle, 49
oneness,50 or close connectedness," the courts sought to avoid the "hard
case" result.3 Although substantially agreeing in the ultimate result, the
courts were split as to whether their theories left unsatisfied the elements of
"notice" or "good faith." 3 Nevertheless, there was apparently general
agreement as to the underlying rationale:
43. S. Rep. No. 652, 92nd Cong.,:2d Sess., CCH 1972 CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 15
[hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
44. Willier, supra note 34, at 133-38. The following comprise the thirty-two states which
have limited the HDC doctrine: Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio. Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Also, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia have enacted statutory provisions
restricting the HDC defense.
45. Senate Report, supra note 43, at 16.
46. Id. at 31, Individual Views of Mr. Proxmire: As Senator Proxmire pointed out in his
dissent, "The committee report argues that consumers themselves must bear some of the
responsibility for shoddy merchandise. These views exhibit an almost shocking disregard of the
main thrust of consumer protection legislation over the last twenty years. While consumers
undoubtedly have some responsibilities, they also have rights. The old legal concept of 'buyer
beware' has no place in modern society."
47. Willier, supra note 44.
48. Senate Report, supra note 46, at 29.
49. Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494, 496 (D.C. 1968).
50. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 480; and see Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 115,.
232 A.2d 405, 413 (1967).
51. Unicov. Owen, 50N.J. 101, 110, 116,232 A.2d 405, 410,413 (1967).
52. For a further discussion of the pre-TLA cases dealing with the holder in due course
defense, see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note I at § 14-8; see also Note, Erosion of Ohio's Holder
in Due Course Doctrine, I OHIO NORTH. L. REV. 111, 111-113 (1973) Ihereinafter cited as
Erosion].
53. See generally, Comment, Unico v. Owen: Consumer Finance Companies as Holders in
Due Course Under the UCC, 54 VA. L. REV. 279 (1968); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 1, at § 14-8; and see Johnston, Unico v. Owen-Judicial Mastery of the "Hard Case," 24
RUTGERS L. REV. 500 (1970).
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. . . the more the holder knows about the underlying transaction and
particularly the more he controls or participates or becomes involved
in it, the less he fits the role of good faith purchaser for value; the
closer the relationship to the underlying agreement which is the
source of the note, the less need there is for giving him the tension-
free rights [as HDC] considered necessary in a fast moving credit-
extending commercial world.5 4
Notwithstanding the specific theory adopted by the court to avoid the "hard
case" result, the intent was usually the same-not to allow a holder the
opportunity to insulate himself from responsibilities for fraudulent sales
practices, which he knew were being used, by feigning ignorance and seeking
the status of holder in due course."
In apparent response to the trend in court decisions involving the HDC in
consumer installnent credit transactions, thirty-two states have passed stat-
utes to modify or repeal the HDC doctrine, and further action is under
consideration in several others . 6 Although a number of these bills are being
proposed, many are weakened by compromise because the users of the HDC
defense have great lobbying strength to preserve the doctrine for their special
interests."7 A number of state statutes dealing either directly or indirectly with
the HDC defense have felt the effects of lobbying pressures for compromise.
An example of legislative compromise which weakened a direct-approach
statute to the point of ineffectiveness was an Ohio statute which purported to
restrict the HDC doctrine."8 The most important party to a consumer
installment credit transaction-the financial institution-had been excluded
from the effect of the statute through legislative compromise.' 9 The statute
consequently was unable to effectively regulate the operation of the HDC
doctrine, since finance companies represent a large majority of the users of
the HDC defense.
In addition to the direct-approach statutes, other states have enacted
indirect-approach statutes which impose only minor limitations on the HDC
doctrine. Such a statute has been categorized as the "non-insulation period"
type."0 Although the "non-insulation period" statute does nothing more than
protect the consumer by disallowing a holder the HDC defense for a fixed
period, 61 it also represents a legislative compromise-a compromise between
what the legislature has recognized as potential harm to an unsuspecting
consumer, and strong lobbying pressure exerted to resist further restriction of
54. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 109, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (1967).
55. Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494, 496 (D.C. 1968).
56. Willier, supra note 44; see also Senate Report, supra note 43, at 16, 29.
57. Erosion, supra note 52, at 114, 115; and see Willier, supra note 34, at 141.
58. Erosion, supra note 52, at 115.
59. Id. at 117.
60. Willier, supra note 34, at 138. Willier categorized this type of statute as a "non-
insulation period" statute.
61. Willier, supra note 34. According to Willier, these "fixed periods" could vary from five
days (in Illinois) to ninety days (in Arizona).
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the HDC doctrine. The ultimate result of such a compromise is apparent in
the Illinois statutes.62 An Illinois statute provides that where a negotiable
instrument is given before the merchandise is delivered, an assignment to a
holder will not preclude the buyer from asserting any defense or right of
action, unless the original sales contract contains the requisite five-day
notification provision. This notice provision allows the buyer five days (from
the date of delivery of the merchandise) in which to give written notice of an
existing right or defense to the holder.63 Although this statute fails to
adequately protect the consumer from the harsh results of the HDC defense
because of the short time in which to act, it clearly exhibits an intent by the
legislature to temporarily curb the effects of the HDC doctrine in order to
avoid potential harm to an unsuspecting consumer.
Present Criticisms
Legal scholars have for years criticized the HDC doctrine. They
uniformly advocate that it be severly restricted or abolished in consumer
installment credit transactions, but offer differing rationales as to why it must
be done. For instance, some are dissatisfied with watching each court struggle
to overcome factual and legal obstacles involved with the HDC doctrine in
order to render an equitable solution.6' Others resent the patchwork-type law
which results from each jurisdiction relying on a different theory to defeat the
HDC defense. 6s Still another group accuses the federal government of
"passing the buck" and "shirking their duties" by neglecting to enact a statute
which demands nationwide uniformity of decision. 66
Which one represents the best reason for doing away with the HDC
doctrine in consumer installment credit transactions? The answer is that they
all do. There is no valid reason to uphold the age-old theory of HDC when its
purpose goes against present-day policies underlying consumer installment
credit transactions. 6 In addition to being contrary to present-day policies, the
HDC doctrine has become an instrument of oppression to consumers for
several reasons. A citizen who is highly protected under one state statute
becomes vulnerable if he moves or transacts business in another state.
62. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121k, § 262D (1974); see also Household Finance Company v.
Mowdy, 13 Ill. App. 3d 822, 827, 300 N.E.2d 863, 867 (1973), where the court held that even
a waiver of defense clause which was implied in an installment contract was nullified by section
262D.
63. For a comprehensive treatment of all state statutes dealing with the HDC doctrine, see
Willier, supra note 34; see also Fairfax, Timely Demise of Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 5.
UCCLJ 117 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Fairfax].
64. Comment, Unico v. Owen: Consumer Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course
Under the UCC, 54 VA. L. REV. 279 (1968); see also Johnston, Unico v. Owen-Judicial
Mastery of the "Hard Case," 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 500 (1970).
65. See, e.g., Willier, supra note 34.
66. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 63; and see Willier, supra note 34.
67. Fairfax, supra note 63, at 119: ". . . when you find courts using silly distinctions to
avoid the application of a rule of law, the reason may be that the rule has outlived its usefulness."
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Individual consumers who cannot afford the cost of litigation are constantly
forced into court. Another means of consumer recourse, class action suits, has
been discouraged in this area by recent amendments to the TLA. 68 Finally, a
"statute which leaves the enforcement to private litigation" rather than to
federal regulation "gives the consumer-bilking swindler a license to oper-
ate."' 69 There is thus an urgent need for a federal statute to restrict or abolish
the HDC doctrine as it applies to consumer installment credit transactions.
After a decision has been made in favor of federal legislation, restricting
the HDC doctrine in consumer installment credit transactions, the remaining
issue centers on the probable consequences of such action. Federal legislation
restricting the HDC doctrine would not be unduly burdensome to holders and
creditors since other avenues, such as recourse financing, are available to an
HDC. Although some advocates maintain that the HDC doctrine is the "oil in
the wheels of commerce,"' 0 a study in Massachusetts has shown that without
it, the consumer credit business would continue with little effect.7 That study
indicated that subsequent to the abolition of the HDC doctrine, the amount of
consumer credit increased. Further, there was no evidence that sellers had
difficulty in transferring negotiable paper." The net result of abolishing the
HDC doctrine amounted to only an increase in recourse financing.73 For
instance where if a dispute existed between the consumer and the seller, the
holder could (1) require the seller to remedy the problem; or (2) require the
seller to take back the paper; or (3) refuse to take any more of the seller's
paper by virtue of his conduct.' 4
The truth remains that consumer installment credit is profitable and that
even if the enactment of a statute abolishing the HDC defense in consumer
installment credit transactions results in an increase in the number of losses,
the banks would not give up the business." The ultimate impact, however,
may force all holders to impose an implied rule of "know your customer."' 6
CONCLUSION
By analyzing the trend in judicial decisions, in state statutes enacted, and
in recent interpretations of the scope of the TLA, it is clear that the HDC
doctrine should not continue to be a dominant force in consumer installment
credit transactions. As indicated by the study in Massachusetts, the existence
68. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5706, § 408(a) (2) (B) (Dec. 15, 1974).
69. Fairfax, supra note 63, at 119.
70. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 457.
71. Willier, supra note 34, at 143.
72. Id. at 144; see also Fairfax, supra note 63, at 120.
73. The term "recourse financing" refers to the alternatives available to a financial
institution (one who buys credit contracts from merchants) when a dispute arises between a
merchant and a consumer which could preclude further performance on the contract.
74. Erosion, supra note 52, at 117; see also Willier, supra note 34, at 144.
75. Fairfax, supra note 63, at 122.
76. Id. at 124.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
of the HDC doctrine is not necessary to maintain the health of the consumer
credit industry or even to provide the "oil in the wheels of commerce" since
the credit industry will continue to reap profits while incurring some minor
losses. The enactment of a state statute abolishing the HDC doctrine neither
increased the cost of credit nor impaired the transferability of the notes. The
continued existence of the HDC doctrine for consumer installment credit
transactions also produces harsh results for the consumer and "hard cases"
for the courts.
Although Congress is willing to defer to state enactments dealing with the
HDC doctrine, a comprehensive federal statute is much preferred for several
reasons. Through federal regulation of the HDC doctrine, uniformity of court
decisions necessary to ensure fairness and justice to all consumers ideally
would be guaranteed regardless of the state in which they live or transact
business. The yoke that Congress has placed on the courts to determine the
method to avoid the "hard case" would be removed by providing federal
regulation of the HDC doctrine. No longer would the courts be forced to
conjure up various theories, such as creditor/conduit under the TLA or close-
connectedness, to overcome harsh results which could have easily been
avoided at the outset by a comprehensive federal statute. Congress appears
content to bypass its responsibilities in this regard, however, forcing the
courts and the state legislatures to carry the burden. 7 Finally, Congress
should be the body responsible for enacting comprehensive legislation since
only Congress possesses the capability to study the entire problem in all
jurisdictions and to enact pervasive legislation.
Admittedly, the solution to this difficult issue is not easily found, but
there are numerous alternatives that could be explored, including a few that
already have been successful as state statutes. Prior to searching for the
ultimate solution, however, Congress must decide between total and partial
abolition of the HDC doctrine for consumer installment credit transactions.
Although the former, in this author's opinion, is the best choice available,
lobbying pressures will weigh heavily in favor of the latter. While the ultimate
solution to the consumer installment credit issue remains uncertain, one point
is quite clear to today's consumer: Congress must stop shifting its burden to
the courts and to the state legislatures and must enact a comprehensive
federal regulation restricting the availability of the HDC defense in consumer
installment credit transactions.
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77. Curiously enough, members of Congress have failed to recognize the double benefit to
be derived by enacting such a statute: they would gain votes through consumer appeal, while
incurring little additional cost to the federal government-a combination that is rarely experienced
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